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Russian Military Intentions 
As both houses of the Russian parliament call upon President Medvedev to support 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s right to self determination, Russian military commanders 
would appear to be consolidating a so-called ‘buffer zone’ within Georgia proper. 
According to Moscow, a battalion of 272 Russian troops will occupy eight ‘forward’ 
positions up to 15km within Georgia proper along its borders with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  A further 250 Russian troops are set to be deployed to the rear of these positions 
to perform ‘logistics, engineering and support’ functions. 
 
As Russia consolidates its foothold in Georgia, serious questions arise as to the future 
role of an apparently resurgent Russian military in Kremlin foreign policy.  Recent 
developments in the Russian military establishment – pioneered by Vladimir Putin in 
particular – give some clues as the future role and status of the Russian military in world 
affairs. 
 
The commander of Russian forces in Georgia, Major General Vyacheslav Borisov, like 
many of his subordinate commanders in the 58th Army is a veteran of the disastrous 
Russian war in Chechnya.  In 2000, Borisov led the quiet withdrawal of approximately 
50,000 Russian troops from Chechnya, halving Moscow’s forces there and effectively 
signalling an end to any Russian hopes for a quick or decisive victory in the Caucasus.  
The war in Chechnya – the first major engagement of the Russian Army after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union -  humiliated the Russian military and cost the Kremlin over 14 
trillion Roubles (3 billion dollars).  By the time Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin 
in 2000, the Russian military was in disarray, suffering from poor morale and widespread 
corruption among its officer class – many of whom were regularly unpaid for periods of 
up to six months or more. Brutality was rife within the armed forces with approximately 
3,500 Russian conscripts killed every year as a direct result of bullying and ill treatment 
within the ranks.  In some cases, Russian conscripts were close to starvation in remote 
outposts within Russia itself. 
 
In October 2002, after the Moscow theatre siege - carried out by Chechen separatists - 
Vladimir Putin and his Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov ordered a series of fundamental 
changes to Russia’s concept of defence in an attempt to radically transform Russian 
military culture.  Following failed attempts during Yeltsin’s presidency to reform the 
Russian military, Putin personally drove the change agenda despite strong resistance from 
within the Russian general staff.  In December 2002, Putin sacked General Gennady 
Trishev, commander of Russia’s forces in Chechnya and accelerated the process of 
subordinating the Russian military to political and civilian control. 
 
Under Putin’s presidency, the security threats confronting Russia were radically re-
evaluated and under his direction the Kremlin devised a new national security concept.  
This vision removed the former Soviet cold war scenario of the US and NATO as the 
primary threat to Russia’s security and replaced it with counter terrorism imperatives 
within Russian territory and the ability to deal with regional ‘small scale contingencies’ 
along its borders – in what the Russians term the ‘near abroad’. 
 
To this end, the Russian military was to be reconfigured by 2015 from a massive standing 
army of over 2 million conscript troops designed to win an all-out global war - a legacy 
of Soviet times - to a more compact force of 1 million professional soldiers capable of 
fighting smaller flexible combined joint operations on a regional basis.  This re-modelled 
Russian army was to draw heavily on the US military and NATO’s Battlegroup concept.  
This fundamental change of strategic doctrine was intended to move Moscow away from 
the massive manpower concept of the former Red Army towards a professionalized 
Russian Army – halved in size – but, like the US military, heavily invested in aviation, 
smart missiles and modern weapons systems in order to develop a highly mobile rapid 
reaction capability within Russia’s borders and throughout its sphere of influence. 
 
To facilitate this radical overhaul, Putin has quadrupled Moscow’s military spending 
from 8 billion dollars in 2001 to 32 billion dollars in 2007.  Currently, 2.8% of Russia’s 
rapidly expanding GDP is spent on defence.  Eleven billion dollars, or 44% of the current 
defence spend is invested in research and development into new combat aircraft, attack 
helicopter programmes, missile systems, IT infrastructure and electronic warfare 
measures.  At the same time, the Russians are stepping down conscription.  They intend 
to reduce the term of compulsory military service from 2 years to 1 year by the end of 
2008 and are planning for an all-volunteer army – of less than one million troops - by 
2015.  This shift in emphasis from the ‘human wave’ philosophy of the Red Army to a 
smaller, highly mobile set of regional forces aims to move away from the static ‘army of 
occupation’ posture of the former Soviet Union. 
 
The Russians have been successful in implementing these changes.  This year alone has 
seen a doubling in the number of new weapons systems issued to Russian combat units.  
So far this year, 30 new weapon systems on land, sea and air have been deployed 
throughout the Russian military including for example the R-29 sea-launched ballistic 
missile, the ground based S-400 Triumfatr missile system and the air launched X-102 
missile.  In a parallel development, the Russian Defence Export Department – 
Rosoboronexport – has doubled its exports of weapons internationally.  Controversially, 
Putin has encouraged western investment and cooperation in his re-energised military 
industrial complex.  Boeing for example are involved in the latest Russian Sukhoi 
aviation programme. 
 
Despite these rapid advances, the Russian military are still approximately seven years 
short of addressing their medium term tactical and strategic goals.  Recent events in 
Georgia will buoy up these developments considerably.  One Russian source commented 
to the Irish Times that Georgia was not part of an overarching military ‘grand design’ - 
which would lead to a pattern of successive invasions and annexations of territories with 
Russian enclaves - but rather ‘an opportunity that presented itself at relatively short 
notice’.  Whilst not fully geared up for its newly conceptualised battle-group concept of 
operations, the Russian military according to this source, ‘after much provocation did a 
quick cost benefit analysis and concluded that Georgia, whilst strategically important was 
militarily small and therefore presented the Russian government with the prospect of a 
swift, winnable war’.  The rest, as they say, is recent history. 
 
Other sources within the Russian military reiterated to the Irish Times that western fears 
of imminent Russian military interventions in Ukraine or the Baltic states were ‘highly 
unlikely’ due to the ‘unacceptable and unsustainable losses’ that would arise.  Rather 
ominously however, they were also keen to point out that events in Georgia in recent 
days were not solely about ‘policing’ the ‘near abroad’.  ‘Rather, these actions send a 
useful and timely meta message to the west about Russia’s emerging status on the world 
stage as a fully fledged economic and military super-power’.   
 
Whilst it would appear that Russia is not quite ready to take on the remainder of its 
‘fractious’ neighbours militarily – just yet – it has demonstrated that it is ready, willing 
and able to do so when confident of victory.  If Russian military development continues 
on its present trajectory, it will in the short to medium term have a global military reach – 
and flushed with its success in Georgia will feel ready to take on the world.  In these 
circumstances, the EU and the US will have to decide whether to embrace or continue to 
bait the awakening bear that is modern Russia.   
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